# TOC R3 NC v Kinkaid TG

## UBI CP

### Text

**Counterplan: Just governments should provide every citizen 18 years of age and older the opportunity to receive a guaranteed basic income adjusted for inflation. Unemployment compensation and food stamps will phase out. Funding is through a reduction in corporate tax loopholes.**

**Solvency**

**The counterplan reduces inequality and poverty**

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

If you have to pay taxes for existing, you should be guaranteed a basic minimum income for surviving. It wouldn't amount to much, but guaranteeing every American citizen 18 and older $1,000 per month, or $12,000 a year, is the most reasonable, practical, and commonsense way to address the inequality crisis that everyone in the country and most of the world is talking about right now. By all, I mean everyone over age 18, regardless of their current job and income situation. It would be optional, so those who already have fulfilling careers or make sufficient enough income to not need the extra $1,000 a month don't have to take it. Ideally, this basic guaranteed income for all would be adjusted for inflation, and would phase in gradually while unemployment compensation and food stamps phase out. Other staples of the safety net, like Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, would still remain. And really, who could argue against this proposal? If we started our welfare spending over from scratch, and just went ahead and guaranteed everyone $1,000 a month, adjusted for inflation, people in poverty would be much better off. Especially given that Republicans in the House of Representatives continue to refuse an extension of unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed (and even refuse to hear stories of struggle from the unemployed), cut billions of dollars from food stamps (in a bipartisan bill), and continue to propose budgets that would rend all social safety nets to pieces in order for larger corporate welfare packages. Or that Senate Republicans who consistently approve "cost-of-living" raises for themselves still don't find it necessary to increase the minimum wage. What does $1,000 a month buy? It can pay for a modest apartment in the $600 to $700 range, a meager amount of groceries, provide enough to pay for a basic phone plan, and leave enough left over for bus/cab fare. It can't pay for high-end cars, flat screen TVs, condominiums, dining out for every meal or a cocaine habit. That amount of money is roughly the same amount of money one would get working a minimum wage job at part-time hours for a large corporation that only sees you as a tool to use for increasing its own profit margin. This means people working at fast food corporations like McDonalds would be able to quit their jobs and have enough to meet the most basic expenses, while looking for more fulfilling work, getting an education, starting their own businesses and otherwise working toward their dreams. Conversely, if someone spends one third of a 24-hour day sleeping, and one third of the day working a job they hate that doesn't pay nearly enough to live on, that only leaves another eight hours for meeting all of their daily obligations, caring for their families, and finding ways to dig themselves out of wage slavery. Until we get a basic guaranteed income for all, a wide majority of Americans who are lucky enough to be employed will serve indefinite sentences of indentured servitude to immensely profitable and profoundly greedy fast food and retail robber barons.

**Reducing corporate tax loopholes is sufficient to fund a guaranteed basic income**

**Gibson 14**

Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar\_b\_5311330.html

The cost of guaranteeing every adult citizen (approximately 225 million, according to census figures) $12,000 a year is roughly $2.8 trillion. That sounds like a lot, until looking into just one of the least-mentioned sources -- offshore tax havens. Currently, $32 trillion is stashed in offshore accounts in notorious tax havens like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Much of that is profit made in the U.S. by American corporations, but booked overseas to avoid taxes. And as journalist Nicholas Shaxson wrote in "Treasure Islands," much more of it is held in blind trusts operated by oppressive authoritarian regimes, drug cartels, human traffickers, and other unsavory characters. $2.8 trillion isn't even one eighth of that amount. We aren't asking for the whole pie, just a piece. And we'll even save them a bite. A few commonsense loophole closures like getting rid of the "carried interest" loophole, eliminating transfer pricing schemes like the "Dutch Sandwich" and "Double Irish" tax loopholes, and instituting a one percent sales tax on all financial transactions on Wall Street would be more than enough to cover the cost of a universal guaranteed income for all. And we still haven't even discussed other widely-supported, commonsense initiatives like turning wasteful Pentagon spending like the F-35 project into money set aside for a universal basic income, taxing investment income at the same rate as real, actual work, raising the inheritance tax to pre-Bush levels, or creating new tax brackets for millionaires and billionaires. By providing a basic income for all citizens through ending tax loopholes and preferential tax treatments for the super-wealthy, we're directly correcting the ever-growing gap between the few who have more than they could ever spend in multiple lifetimes, and the vast majority fighting over crumbs. More importantly, we're also giving the poorest Americans a fighting chance at fulfilling their dreams, rather than spending their best years slaving away for a corporate giant that doesn't respect basic human needs. We can't call ourselves a free country until working Americans are freed from poverty wages and dead-end jobs

### N/B

#### Minimum wage hikes are historically racist

**Sowell 13** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

Minimum-wage laws can even affect the level of racial discrimination. In an earlier era, when racial discrimination was both legally and socially accepted, **minimum-wage laws were often used openly to price minorities out of the** job **market**. In 1925, a minimum-wage law was passed in the Canadian province of British Columbia, with the intent and effect of pricing Japanese immigrants out of jobs in the lumbering industry. A Harvard professor of that era referred approvingly to Australia’s minimum wage law as a means to “protect the white Australian’s standard of living from the invidious competition of the colored races, particularly of the Chinese” who were willing to work for less. **In South Africa during** the era of **apartheid, white labor unions urged that a minimum-wage law be applied** to all races, **to keep black workers from taking jobs** away from white unionized workers by working for less than the union pay scale. Some **supporters of the first federal minimum-wage** law **in the U**nited **S**tates — the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 — **used** exactly **the same rationale**, citing the fact that Southern construction companies, using non-union black workers, were able to come north and underbid construction companies using unionized white labor. These supporters of minimum-wage laws understood long ago something that today’s supporters of such laws seem not to have bothered to think through. People whose wages are raised by law do not necessarily benefit, because they are often less likely to be hired at the imposed minimum-wage rate. Labor unions have been supporters of minimum-wage laws in countries around the world, since these laws price nonunion workers out of jobs, leaving more jobs for union members. **People** who are **content to advocate policies that sound good,** whether for political reasons or just to feel good about themselves, often **do not bother to think through the consequences** beforehand or to check the results afterwards.

#### Living wage is patriarchal

**Grover 5** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Second, the idea of need is problematic in living wages because of its close association with the concept of the family wage. This issue is recognized in sections of the living wage movement (Brenner, 2002), but has yet to be overcome. This means that **living wages are premised upon an androcentric view** of wage structures: **that a male breadwinner should be able to earn the majority of income for his** spouse and **dependent** children. **This is the case in living wages, because**, as we have seen, **there is an expectation that there will be a full time worker in households**. While there is care in living wage literature not to assign this role to men, it is difficult to see how the assumptions of living wages will break from the male breadwinner model. What this means in practice is that living wages can only meet the needs of workers and their families if they conform to the male breadwinner model. Hence, the difficulties demonstrated in Table 1 with delivering higher than the ‘making work pay’ strategy incomes to lone-mother-headed households. If wages were related as closely to need as it is sometimes portrayed in arguments for living wages, those people with dependent children, those working part time and those in families with only one earner would be paid a higher hourly wage compared to those families without dependent children, those with full time earners and those with multiple earners. In other words, **those workers who do not conform to the male breadwinner model have potentially the most to gain financially from living wages, but under current proposals they** would actually **gain the least.**

#### UBI solves

**Pateman 4** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

The second consequence, and a crucial difference between basic income and stakeholding, is **that a basic income would give citizens the freedom not to be employed**. Both a basic income, if set at the appropriate level, and a capital grant would provide enlarged opportunities for individuals, but the opportunities provided by a basic income would be far wider than those offered by a stake, since the new opportunities would not be confined to the competitive market. A basic income, like a stake, would make it possible for anyone (at any point in their life, not merely while they are young) to go back to school, to retrain for a new occupation, or to open a business. But a basic income providing a modest but decent standard of living would do much more. In The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich von Hayek—like G. D. H. Cole from a very different point on the political spectrum—argued that employment fostered an outlook among employees that was an impediment to freedom. The employed, he wrote, are “in many respects . . . alien and often inimical to much that consti- tutes the driving force of a free society.”20 His solution was that there should be as many gentlemen of private means as possible to counteract the deleterious effect of employment. In effect, such gentlemen have large basic incomes, albeit not provided by a government. At a very much lower level of resources a basic income democratizes the freedom open to a gentlemen of private means to spend time in scholarly pursuits, good works, writing poetry, cultivating friendships, hunting, or being a drone or a wastrel. A basic income would allow individuals at any time to do voluntary or politicalwork, for example, to learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves to family life, or to have a quiet period of self-reassessment or contemplation. By opening up this range of opportunities and uncoupling income and standard of life from employment, a basic income has the potential both to encourage critical reassessment of the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, employment, and citizenship and to open the possibility that these institutions could be remade in a new, more democratic form. A capital grant given to young people with the aim of assisting individual economic success lacks the same potential. In The Stakeholder Society, Ackerman and Alstott argue that a stake encourages individuals, in away that a basic income cannot, to reflect upon what they want to do with their lives, and appraise their situation. “Civic reflection” and attention to “the fate of the nation” become possible when economic anxieties are lifted.21 A “purer form of patriotism” will arise out of the “simple gratitude to the nation” that citizens will feel as they think about their capital grant and the debt that they owe to their country for the economic citizenship that comes with stakeholding.22 Patriotism and gratitude, however, have only a tenuous connection to individual freedom. Provision of a one-time capital grant will no doubt encourage individuals to consider what courses of action are open to them, and might even foster reflection on the debt they owe to their country. But it seems implausible that it would help promote reflection on the political implications of the structural connections between marriage, employment, and citizenship. Both the wide variety of opportunities made possible **when employment becomes** truly **voluntary** and the fact that **women’s freedom would be** greatly **enhanced** mean that, unlike a stake, a basic income has the potential to open the door to institutional change— providing that democratization is at the forefront of discussion and that feminist arguments are taken seriously. The freedom not to be employed runs counter to the direction of much recent public policy and political rhetoric (especially in Anglo-American countries, though the policies are international), and this makes stakeholding more palatable than basic income in the current political climate. The effect of such policies and rhetoric is to draw even tighter the long-standing link between employment and citizenship, at the very time when a reassessment has been made possible by changing circumstances. The institution of employment is a barrier to democratic freedom and citizenship in two ways. First, economic enterprises have an undemocratic structure, a point that I shall not pursue here.23 Second, as feminist scholars have demonstrated, the **relationship between** the **institutions of marriage**, employment, and citizenship has **meant that** the **standing of wives as citizens has always been**, and remains, **problematic**. The Anglo-American social insurance system was constructed on the assumption that wives not only were their husbands’ economic dependents but lesser citizens whose entitlement to benefits depended on their private status, not on their citizenship. **Male “breadwinners,”** who made a contribution from their earnings to “insure” that they received benefits in the event of unemployment or sickness, and in their old age, **were the primary citizens**. Their employment was treated as the contribution that a citizen could make to the well-being of the community. Ackerman and Alstott acknowledge this in their criticism of “workplace justice,” 24 and their recognition that unconditional retirement pensions would be particularly important for the many older women whose benefits still largely derive from their husbands’ employment record.25 That is to say, only paid employment has been seen as “work,” as involving the tasks that are the mark of a productive citizen and contributor to the polity. Other contributions, notably all the work required to reproduce and maintain a healthy population and care for infants, the elderly, the sick, and infirm—the **caring tasks,** most of which are not paid for and are undertaken by women—**have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.**

#### The aff’s valorization of wage labor perpetuates an ableist notion of productivity

**Gulli 10** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

In his book on queerness and disability, McRuer offers a critique of **productivity as compulsory able-bodiedness,** “which in a sense **produces disability**” (McRuer 2006: 2). **The alternative to able- bodied dogmas is that “a disabled world is possible and desirable”** (p. 71). The idea that a better world is a disabled world is very provocative, but it is the necessary outcome of a critique of productivity. Of course, what this means is that disability must stop being “the raw material against which the imagined future world is formed” (p. 72)— an idea, McRuer says, typical of liberationist models. Whenever able-bodiedness is the goal, perhaps unwanted, the specters of normalization, in dependence, productivity, and sovereignty also linger. For McRuer, the construction of able-bodiedness is linked to the construction of hetero sexuality: “The **institutions in our culture** that produce and secure a heterosexual identity also **work to secure an able- bodied identity**” (p. 151). These normalizing identities, essential to the logic of the same, are not differences among differences, nor do they open up the realm of the universal. They are not differences because they have closed the gap between the norm they have established and the moments of anxiety that brought them to establish the norm. Indeed, they are not different from that anxiety, as in having moved away from it. Rather, that anxiety no longer exists, and it has never existed. They are what they have always been; what they will always be. Difference to them is a matter of indifference. Yet, they are not universals because they are incapable of the leap into what they are not, incapable of reaching into the univocal and neutral structure that connects the one to the other, the structure of otherness as such. They have lost their contingency, no longer able not to be. McRuer speaks of “those [desirable] disabled/queer moments” as of “temporary or contingent universalization” (p. 157; emphasis added), that is, moments in which, as I understand it, we are what we have not been and would not be, able not to be what we are, and thus, able to reach into the other. However, it is not the idealized other that we encounter, nor ourselves as and in the other; rather, we encounter our own otherness, which is the same with what is different from us, for it is difference itself— not merely what- is, but what- could- be. The universalizing potentiality present in this, that is, in **the “dis-” of disability**, just as in the “ab-” of the abnormal (the abyss surrounding the norm), **subverts the logic of the contract** and of a multitude **united under the sovereign sign**. The disunited multitude feared by Hobbes (1994: XVIII) the multitude that commits injustice, reaches, through the “dis-” of

#### UBI’s key to freedom from wage labor and democratic re-thinking of employment institutions

**Pateman 4** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

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Male “breadwinners,” who made a contribution from their earnings to “insure” that they received benefits in the event of unemployment or sickness, and in their old age, were the primary citizens. Their employment was treated as the contribution that a citizen could make to the well-being of the community. Ackerman and Alstott acknowledge this in their criticism of “workplace justice,” 24 and their recognition that unconditional retirement pensions would be particularly important for the many older women whose benefits still largely derive from their husbands’ employment record.25 That is to say, only paid employment has been seen as “work,” as involving the tasks that are the mark of a productive citizen and contributor to the polity. Other contributions, notably all the work required to reproduce and maintain a healthy population and care for infants, the elderly, the sick, and infirm—the caring tasks, most of which are not paid for and are undertaken by women—have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.

**Living wage raises food prices, which disproportionately harms the poor**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

However, negative employment effects are not the only consequence of raising the minimum wage. Employers often cannot fully absorb the costs of an increased mandated wage rate by cutting their workforce because they need that labor to successfully run their businesses. Employers are forced to turn to other methods to protect their bottom line and stay in business. The costs of a minimum wage hike are often passed on to consumers in what economist Daniel Aaronson calls “price pass-through.” In a study of prices in the restaurant and fast food industry—an industry that heavily employs and serves low-wage earners—Aaronson, French and MacDonald found an increase in the minimum wage also increases the prices of food items.24 Using data from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1995 to 1997, the economists examined 7,500 food items (usually a complete meal) from 1,000 different establishments in 88 different geographic areas. They found the increase in menu prices affected limited service restaurants the hardest. These are restaurants where most diners pay at the counter and take their food home with them. These restaurants are also more likely to employ low-wage workers and thus more likely to have their business costs rise as a result of a minimum wage increase. The study found that in these instances, almost 100 percent of the increase in labor costs is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.25 These results are consistent with most of the economic literature on the subject. Sara Lemos of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) looked at more than 20 papers on the subject and found that most studies predicted a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would result in a 4 percent increase in food prices and a 0.4 percent increase in prices overall.26 Unfortunately, the businesses hit hardest by an increase to the minimum wage are not only the types of places where low-income people are employed, but also businesses frequented by low-income consumers. Food prices are of particular importance to people living near or below the poverty line as they tend to spend a greater percentage of their family budget on food. The low-wage employees who experience an increase to their wages due to a minimum wage increase will have the benefit of higher wages largely offset by higher prices. Additionally, non-minimum wage earners will face higher prices without the corresponding increase in wages. Thus, they will likely cut back spending to compensate. These cutbacks in spending may also result in substitutions toward cheaper, lower quality goods.

## UE DA

### General

#### A large consensus of studies confirms minimum wage hikes cause unemployment

**Neumark 14** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**An extensive review of** this **new**er wave of **evidence looked at more than 100 studies** of the employment effects of minimum wages, assessing the quality of each study and focusing on those that are most reliable [2], [3]. **Studies focusing on the least skilled were highlighted**, as the predicted job destruction effects of minimum wages were expected to be more evident in those studies. Reflecting the greater variety of methods and sources of variation in minimum wage effects used since 1982, this review documents a wider range of estimates of the employment effects of the minimum wage than does the review of the first wave of studies [1]. **Nearly two-thirds of the studies** reviewed **estimated that** the **minimum wage had negative** (although not always statistically significant) **effects on employment**. Only eight found positive employment effects. **Of the 33 studies judged** the **most credible,** 28, or **85%**, **pointed to negative employment effects**. These included research on Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Portugal, the UK, and the US. In particular, the studies focusing on the least-skilled workers find stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with effects near or larger than the consensus range in the US data. In contrast, few—if any—studies provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages.

### Case Turn

**Turns the case; disability reforms won’t happen during high unemployment**

**Greve 9**

Bent Greve (Professor, University of Roskilde, Denmark) “The labour market situation of disabled people in European countries and implementation of employment policies: a summary of evidence from country reports and research studies.” Report prepared for the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED). April 2009. http://www.disability-europe.net/content/aned/media/ANED%20Task%206%20final%20report%20-%20final%20version%2017-04-09.pdf

This report is based on evidence submitted in national reports produced by members of the Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED) representing the EU Member States (except Luxembourg) plus Norway and Iceland. It is supplemented with evidence from existing studies with a focus on disabled people’s access to integration and retention in the labour market, and recommendations to enhance the current position. Action on the employment situation of disabled people in European countries should be considered in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the Lisbon Agenda and European Employment Strategy, the Employment Directive 2000/78/EC, and the European Disability Action Plan. Labour market activation and inclusion for disabled people are easier to address in periods of increasing labour demand and lower levels of unemployment than in times of recession. The current economic downturn raises substantial challenges to the goals and actions proposed in recent periods of policy development. It will be important to review national developments in light of this situation.

### Sheltered Workshops Scenario

#### Specifically, the aff kills employment at non-profit disabled workshops.

**Riley 14** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

If you want to understand the harm that proponents of **raising** the **minimum wage** are willing to impose on people at the bottom of the labor market, look no further than a recent article in Bloomberg News by Lorraine Woellert. As of January 1, federal contractors will be required to pay workers no less than $10.10 per hour. As Woellert notes, The rule **applies to** hundreds of **non-profit contractors that provide jobs to adults with disabilities**. Many of those workers will get a raise, but others might be unemployed as companies make hard choices about who they can afford to keep on the payroll. Indeed, **as many nonprofits** are already **operat**ing **on shoestring budgets,** the question of **whether they can afford to keep on a disabled worker who might** sweep floors or **do** other **menial tasks will be** a **difficult** one. Woellert writes about a young man named **Luke Grossman** who does laundry at the local YMCA in Norfolk, VA. He **has Down Syndrome and**, as his father notes, “**Luke’s life looks a** whole **lot different if he loses his job**. . . . Anything which is going to have more people with disabilities sitting at home with nothing to do can’t be good.” The company that employs Luke does laundry for the U.S. military and other organizations. It employs about 1,000 disabled workers, some at below minimum wage. Things will not be able to stay the same under the new rule, according to the CEO. But proponents of it, including Labor Secretary Thomas Perez, insist that the disabled are being exploited when they are paid less than minimum wage. The head of the National Disability Rights Network, which filed the lawsuit that resulted in the new federal rule, acknowledged that disabled people might lose their jobs as a result but he explained, “It’s dying with your rights on.” **Obviously we don’t want the disabled exploited but the** vast **majority of disabled people are not employed** at all and since the recession hit their employment has been curtailed even further. For many **businesses** and nonprofits, hiring people for these low-end jobs—whether they are disabled, young, inexperienced or down on their luck—is as much a business decision as it is a philanthropic one. Theydo **want to give people a chance to work for a living**, to become part of a team, to integrate themselves into the community. **But there is always the bottom line**. And **to the extent that** the **government makes these decisions harder** for a boss to make, **they are making life worse for a lot of people.** As Larry Grossman says, It’s not like I’m opposed to [Luke] getting a raise, [but] you have to look at the intangible things that people get from the workplace. Luke really loves going to work. It gives him a sense of purpose.

**Disabled people are fighting for subminimum wage work. Sheltered workshops are a key safe space, but funding concerns mean minimum wage laws would undermine them.**

**Sommerstein 4-14**

David Sommerstein (Reporter for NPR). “Advocates Fight To Keep Sheltered Workshops For Workers With Disabilities.” NPR. 14 April 2015. http://www.npr.org/2015/04/14/395287097/advocates-fight-to-keep-sheltered-workshops-for-disabled-workers

**Subminimum Wages For The Disabled**: Godsend Or Exploitation? Those words are long overdue for disability advocates who have fought for inclusion in the workplace for decades. In 1987, Michael Callahan wrote a book arguing that outside jobs are achievable for almost everyone if the job is customized for the individual and a company's needs, rather than wedging a person with a disability into an existing job. "So bring me a person who's in a coma and let's agree right now until they get out of the coma we won't try to get them a job," he says. "But anyone else, let's work on it. And what I can say to you is employers are not pushing back." Tom Golden, with the Employment and Disability Institute at Cornell, says that employers are actually ahead of the curve and that they're hungry for new labor markets as baby boomers retire. "They're talking about how they're ready to manage populations in the past that have been marginalized," he says. In sheltered workshops, people with disabilities are paid according to how quickly they're able to complete tasks. Usually, they make well **below minimum wage**. At Production Unlimited, they make office supplies, safety equipment and binders for the U.S. Army.i In sheltered workshops, people with disabilities are paid according to how quickly they're able to complete tasks. Usually, they make well below minimum wage. At Production Unlimited, they make office supplies, safety equipment and binders for the U.S. Army. David Sommerstein/North Country Public Radio But local experts fear it's another story in sluggish economies like Watertown. And they worry the state won't provide enough funding for support and training for those new models to work. About 300,000 people work in sheltered workshops nationwide. Daphne Pickert, who runs St. Lawrence NYSARC, another disability services provider, says ending them removes an option for people who may never be ready for an outside job. "For some people, because of their actual diagnosis and disability, they need the support of the workshop," she says, "And **they literally cannot perform in a competitive setting**." David Schneider, a longtime employee at the Watertown workshop, says he's afraid of being made fun of in the nondisabled world, or of getting yelled at, or of **going jobless.** "Who's going to trust us?" he asks. "And if we screw up, think of how the customers would feel. And who's going to get blamed for it? We will, probably." It's a risk for workers to leave Production Unlimited. And for anyone, it's hard to take a risk when your job is on the line.

**Sheltered workshops are key to jobs training; disabled people will get taken advantage of in the broader workforce.**

**CAMPBELL 14**

New federal rules could close sheltered workshops for people with disabilities BY MATT THE KANSAS CITY STAR 08/25/20 8:19 PM 08/25/2014 8:36 PM

“But for some people, I feel a workshop is the best place for them to maybe gain some work skills,” Liz Muleski said. “Sara was so naive and and so susceptible to someone taking advantage of her right out of high school.” About 450,000 people nationwide work in sheltered workshops or participate in segregated day programs. About 60 sheltered workshops operate in Kansas, employing about 5,000 people. About 90 workshops in Missouri employ roughly about 7,500 people. Nearly 800 people work in five sheltered workshops in Jackson County. Three workshops in the county have closed in recent years. The Supreme Court ruling, known as the Olmstead decision, was based on the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Justice Department in 2009 launched an aggressive effort to enforce compliance. The point of the law is “to abolish the low expectations that have kept people with disabilities out of their communities for decades,” Jocelyn Samuels, an acting assistant attorney general in the Civil Rights Division, said in April in announcing the push. But many parents and guardians of people with disabilities fear that without sheltered workshops, their loved ones will languish. They will have nothing to do and fewer social interactions.

**Sheltered workshops are key to peer relationships among the disabled; that outweighs broader social inclusion – prefer studies on this issue.**

**Cox 2**

Jamie E. Cox. “A COMPARISON STUDY OF SHELTERED WORK VERSUS SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT WITHIN COMMUNITY-BASED REHABILITATION FACILITIES.” The Graduate School University of Wisconsin-Stout August, 2002.

Another alternative explanation for the results may involve the changing face of sheltered employment facilities. There is evidence that sheltered workshops are contracting better jobs and greater job variety than in the past, hence providing quality work with the added supports many client-workers, parents, and guardians feel are needed. It should also be taken into consideration that, although inclusion into the community is extremely important and desirable, relationships among ones peer group is also a major component that can be met at a sheltered facility. The facility **[It] is able to provide an environment where many client-workers are on the** 34 **same social and intellectual level** as one another **enabling strong friendships** to form that are often different than those in the working community where coworkers often act more as “mentors” than friends. **The impact of** **conducting a study** such as this one **is very significant** when looking at the field of rehabilitation as a whole. First, when focusing the survey on a specific type of rehabilitation facility, it becomes increasingly evident just how many different types of services are provided for individuals with disabilities and the numerous ways these facilities all operate to achieve a common goal of increasingly an individual’s independence, quality of living, vocational skills, and self-worth. With this information, however, it also makes it increasing clear why it is so difficult to devise one survey, system, or instrument to study one specific aspect of rehabilitation when so many different techniques are being utilized.

## Case

### Eugenics Turn

#### Living wage is a eugenic tool that perpetuates ableism

**Leonard 5** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

During the second half of the Progressive Era, beginning roughly in 1908, progressive economists and their reform allies achieved many statutory victories, including state laws that regulated working conditions, banned child labor, instituted “mothers’ pensions,” capped working hours and, the sine qua non, fixed minimum wages. In **using eugenics to justify exclusionary** immigration **legislation**, the race-suicide **theorists offered a model to economists** advocating labor reforms, notably those affiliated with the American Association for Labor Legislation, the organization of academic economists that Orloff and Skocpol (1984, p. 726) call the “leading association of U.S. social reform advocates in the Progressive Era.” Progressive economists, like their neoclassical critics, believed that binding minimum wages would cause job losses. However, the progressive **economists** also **believed** that the **job loss induced by minimum wages was a social benefit, as it performed the eugenic service ridding the labor force of the** “**unemployable**.” Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1897 [1920], p. 785) put it plainly: “With regard to certain sections of the population [the “unemployable”], this unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but actually of social health.” “[O]f all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb (1912, p. 992) opined in the Journal of Political Economy, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them to unrestrainedly compete as wage earners.” **A minimum wage was seen to operate eugenically** through two channels: **by deterring** prospective **immigrants** (Henderson, 1900) and also by removing from employment the “unemployable,” who, thus identified, could be, for example, segregated in rural communities or sterilized. The notion that minimum-wage induced disemployment is a social benefit distinguishes its progressive proponents from their neoclassical critics, such as Alfred Marshall (1897), Philip Wicksteed (1913), A. C. Pigou (1913) and John Bates Clark (1913), who regarded job loss as a social cost of minimum wages, not as a putative social benefit (Leonard, 2000). Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, a leading progressive economist who served as president of the AEA in 1922, provides an example. **Worthy wage-earners, Seager** (1913a, p. 12) **argued, need protection from the** “wearing **competition of the** casual worker and the drifter” and from the other “**unemployable**” **who** unfairly **drag down** the **wages** of more deserving workers (1913b, pp. 82–83). The minimum wage protects deserving workers from the competition of the unfit by making it illegal to work for less. Seager (1913a, p. 9) wrote: “The operation of **the minimum wage** requirement **would** merely **extend the definition of defectives to embrace all individuals**, **who** even after having received special training, **remain incapable of** adequate **self-support**.” Seager (p. 10) made clear what should happen to those who, even after remedial training, could not earn the legal minimum: “**If we are to maintain a race** that is to be made of up **of capable, efficient and independent individuals** and family groups **we must** courageously **cut off lines of heredity that** have been proved to be undesirable by isolation or sterilization . . . .” The unemployable were thus those workers who **earned less than** some measure of an adequate standard of living, a standard the British called a “decent maintenance” and Americans referred to as **a** “**living wage**.” For labor reformers, firms that paid workers less than **the living wage** to which they were entitled were deemed parasitic, as were the workers who accepted such wages—on grounds that someone (charity, state, other members of the household) would need to make up the difference. For progressives, a legal minimum wage had the useful property of **sort**ing **the unfit, who would lose their jobs, from the deserving** workers, who would retain their jobs. Royal Meeker, a Princeton economist who served as Woodrow Wilson’s U.S. Commissioner of Labor, opposed a proposal to subsidize the wages of poor workers for this reason. Meeker preferred a wage floor because it would disemploy unfit workers and thereby enable their culling from the work force. “It is much better to enact a minimum-wage law even if it deprives these unfortunates of work,” argued Meeker (1910, p. 554). “Better that the state should support the inefficient wholly and prevent the multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and unthrift, enabling them to bring forth more of their kind.” A. B. Wolfe (1917, p. 278), an American progressive economist who would later become president of the AEA in 1943, also argued for the eugenic virtues of removing from employment those who “are a burden on society.” In his Principles of Economics, Frank Taussig (1921, pp. 332–333) asked rhetorically, “how to deal with the unemployable?” Taussig identified two classes of unemployable worker, distinguishing the aged, infirm and disabled from the “feebleminded . . . those saturated with alcohol or tainted with hereditary disease . . . [and] the irretrievable criminals and tramps. . . .” The latter class, Taussig proposed, “should simply be stamped out.” “We have not reached the stage,” Taussig allowed, “where we can proceed to chloroform them once and for all; but at least **they can be segregated**, shut up in refuges and asylums, **and prevented from propagating their kind.**”5 The progressive idea that the unemployable could not earn a living wage was bound up with the progressive view of wage determination. Unlike the economists who pioneered the still-novel marginal productivity theory, most progressives agreed that wages should be determined by the amount that was necessary to provide a reasonable standard of living, not by productivity, and that the cost of this entitlement should fall on firms.6

### Social Mobility Turn

#### Minimum wage hikes prevent more unskilled workers from entering the job market, killing their social mobility

**Kersey 4** writes

Over the longer term, **minimum-wage** or near-minimum wage **work can serve as a springboard to better jobs. Unskilled workers may gain** new **skills**, **or** gain **a record of reliability**, that allows them to move on to better-paying positions. Low-wage earners frequently see their wages rise quickly: **Researchers** at two universities, Florida State and Miami of Ohio, **found that full-time workers hired at** the **minimum wage received a median pay increase of 13 percent within their first year**, which shows that low-wage employees are able to work through minimum wage jobs into better ones.[3] The schedule of increases currently under consideration, first to $5.90 then $6.65 an hour a year later, is not all that much greater than the pay raises that occur naturally. **Simply finding full-time work**, including jobs at or near the minimum wage, **provides the poor with** the **means to escape poverty**. Research by the Employment Policy Institute shows 47 percent of families living below the poverty line in 1997 managed to make it over the poverty line in 1998. The authors of that study concluded that "earnings from minimum wage work and the Earned Income Tax Credit both significantly reduced the number of working poor in the 1990s."[4] **Artificially raising wages will cut off this difficult but direct path to greater prosperity for many** poor families, and will delay the entry of other workers, including youth, into paid work **by needlessly increasing the cost of unskilled labor**. Employers will not be able to afford to hire as many unskilled workers, and will respond by cutting back services or replacing workers with machinery.

#### Empirics confirm

**Clemens and Wither 14** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

5.6 Transitions from Low-Wage Work into Middle Class Earnings We next analyze income growth through the lens of economic mobility, a topic of significant recent interest (Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2014; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner, 2014). Concern regarding the minimum wage’s effects on upward mobility has a long history (Feldstein, 1973). A potential mechanism for such effects, namely the availability of on-the-job training, has received some attention in the literature (Hashimoto, 1982; Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan, 2004). We are not aware, however, of direct evidence of the minimum wage’s effects on individuals’ transitions into employment at higher wages and earnings levels. Because we observe individuals for four years, we are able to track transitions of lowwage workers into middle and lower middle class earnings. The data reveal that initially low-wage workers spend non-trivial numbers of months with earnings exceeding those of a full time, minimum wage worker. Consider earnings above $1500, which could be generated by full time work at $8.80 per hour. During the first year of our sample, 30workers with average baseline wages less than $7.50 earn more than $1500 in 8 percent of months. By the sample’s last two years this rises, adjusting for inflation, to 18 percent. We investigate the minimum wage’s effects on the likelihood of reaching such earnings. Table 6 reports the results. **We find significant declines in economic mobility**, in particular **for transitions into lower middle class earnings**. For the full sample with average baseline wages less than $7.50, the difference-in-differences estimate implies that **binding minimum wage increases reduced** the **probability of reaching earnings above $1500 by 4.9 percent**age points. This represents a 24 percent reduction relative to the control group’s medium-run probability of attaining such earnings. As with previous results, this finding cannot readily be explained by cross-state differences in economic conditions. Netting out the experience of individuals with baseline wages between $8.50 and $10.00 moderately increases the point estimate to 5.4 percentage points (26 percent). The **estimated reductions** in the probability of reaching lower middle class earnings levels **are particularly meaningful for low-skilled workers with no college education**. In the difference-in-differences specification, the estimated decline in this group’s probability of earning more than $1500 per month is 4.9 percentage points (see column 2). In the triple-difference specification the estimate is 8.2 percentage points. Declines of these magnitudes represent 32 and 54 percent declines relative to the control group’s probability of reaching such earnings. For those with at least some college education, the estimated declines average a more moderate 4 percentage points, equivalent to 17 percent of the control group’s probability of reaching such earnings. Figure 8 presents the raw data underlying these results, and Appendix Table A10 reports the robustness of the estimated effects to the same set of specifications checks as the outcomes previously analyzed. We next examine the probability of reaching the middle-income threshold of $3000 per month. For the full sample, we estimate that binding minimum wage increases 31reduced this probability by 1.8 percentage points. In the difference-in-differences specification, this estimate is statistically distinguishable from 0 at the 10 percent level; in the triple-difference specification this is not the case, although the point estimate is essentially unchanged. Though our sub-sample analysis has little precision, the average medium-run effect appears to be driven primarily by those with at least some college education. The full sample decline of 1.7 percentage points is a non-trivial 26 percent of the control group’s medium-run probability of reaching such earnings. We interpret the evidence as implying that binding minimum wage increases reduced the medium-run class mobility of low-skilled workers. Such workers became significantly less likely to rise to the lower middle class earnings threshold of $1500 per month. The reduction was particularly large for low-skilled workers with relatively little education. The dynamics of our estimated employment and class mobility results are suggestive of the underlying mechanisms. Our employment results emerge largely during the first year following the increase in the federal minimum wage. By construction, our mobility outcomes are not outcomes that can be affected by the loss of a full time minimum wage job. **Effects on mobility** into lower middle class earnings only **emerge over subsequent years**. It appears that **binding minimum wage increases blunted** these **workers’ prospects for medium-run economic mobility by reducing** their **short-run access to opportunities for accumulating experience and developing skills**. This period’s minimum wage increases may thus have made the first rung on the earnings ladder more difficult for low-skilled workers to reach.

### Work Hours Turn

#### Minimum wage hikes force employers to reduce hours

**Perry 14** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

Posts on CD about the minimum wage always generate a higher than average number of comments, and Friday’s CD post (“Do Demand Curves Slope Down or Not?”) was no exception – there have been 46 comments so far. Most of the minimum wage debate centers on the issue of whether minimum wage increases have any effects on employment levels. Specifically, does the empirical evidence point to any significantly negative effects on employment levels following minimum wage hikes, as clearly predicted by economy theory? Some empirical evidence like the much-cited 1994 study by Card and Krueger found “no indication that the rise in the minimum wage reduced employment” at fast-food restaurants in New Jersey following a minimum wage increase to $5.05 per hour compared to nearby fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania where the minimum wage remained constant at $4.25. Let me attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between: a) economic theory, which clearly predicts a negative relationship between the minimum wage and the quantity of unskilled workers demanded by employers, and b) some of the empirical evidence that finds no negative employment effects following minimum wage hikes. Here’s the key point: The negative relationship predicted by economic theory is not: a) between minimum wage hikes and the number of unskilled workers employed, but b) between minimum wage hikes and the number of unskilled work hours demanded by employers. The two charts above help to illustrate that difference: In the top chart, **we see a negative relationship between** an **increase in the minimum wage and** the number of **hours of unskilled work** demanded by employers in the 12-month period following the increase in the hourly price of unskilled labor (to capture the effects on future hiring). **Like an increase in** the **cost of** any other **labor** input or other input like food, energy, raw materials, machinery, equipment rental, or building rent, **employers** facing a 39% increase in the cost of unskilled labor (from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour) **would have no other choice** than to reduce the number of unskilled work hours – **it would** simply **be a necessary strategy for survival**. As I pointed out recently, a minimum wage increase to $10.10 per hour would be the equivalent to an annual tax of more than $6,000 per full-time worker earning the minimum wage. The various strategies employers might use to reduce their demand for unskilled work hours over the 12-month period following a 39% minimum wage hike might include: a) reducing the number of hours worked per week by entry-level unskilled workers, e.g. cutting their hours from 40 to 30 per week, or from 30 to 20, etc., b) reducing the number of unskilled workers currently employed through layoffs, c) reducing the number of unskilled workers that employers might have previously been planning on adding to staffing levels in the future, d) substituting skilled workers for the now relatively more expensive unskilled workers, and e) investing in technologies that would substitute automation, mechanization, robotics, and self-serve options for unskilled workers. **Although the effect** of a 39% minimum wage hike **on employment levels might be uncertain, the negative effect on** the **number of hours of unskilled labor demanded by employers would be** much **more certain** and predictable according to the Law of Demand. The bottom chart shows graphically how it would be possible that an increase in the minimum wage might not adversely affect the number of unskilled workers employed by looking at the relationship between the average weekly compensation for unskilled workers (and not the hourly monetary wage) and the number of unskilled workers.

### AT Discourse First

#### Their critique of ableist language is silly and condescending toward persons with disabilities

**Cogburn 14** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Increasingly, when I see someone accused of "ableism" because of some inartful (or perfectly fine) turn of expression, I become angry. It just strikes me as Forrest Gumpism. Everything is really peachy, as long as we confine our discourse to positive platitudes (and attacking those who don't so confine themselves).\* But **all else being equal, it is better to be able. Speaking in ways that presupposes this is not bad**, at least not bad **merely in virtue of the presupposition** (see also the Johnny Knoxville/Eddie Barbanell video below). The place where my son gets occupational therapy (to deal with a bunch of sensory processing disabilities he inherited from me)\*\* is called "Abilities." Good for them! I don't want my child to suffer as much as I do. The thought that I should feel guilty for that, or feel guilty for expressing something that presupposes it, just strikes me as insane. And I don't feel guilty for saying it strikes me as insane. To not be able to use "insane" as a derogation when it is appropriate would be to lose sight of the fact that it is horrible to be insane, which would in fact be extraordinarily cruel to the insane. **My friend Justin** Isom **dealt with** his **blindness and cancer with incredible dignity**. He played a very bad hand extraordinarily well. But **any pretense that it was not a bad hand would have been insulting** and condescending (just as he would have taken, on the other side, excessive pity to be condescending). **Justin thought it** was **hilarious when I** first **squirmed about saying "see you later"** to him. When you have a blind friend you realize just how much language is seeded with visual metaphors. For the anti-ableist, we are supposed to police our speech in ways that would pretend otherwise. (And please read Neil Tennant's obituary for Justin below,\*\*\* which speaks to Justin's astonishingly rich ability (not just astonshingly rich for a blind guy, but all the more interesting and impressive since it's a blind guy talking) to describe experiences, such as public street in Indonesia, in visual terms.) **But for the anti-ableist speech policer, we can't say that** a good idea is "visionary" because that might have hurt Justin's feelings. No. **I reject that. You don't speak for Justin** and you have no right to present him as emotionally infantile enough to care about such things. **Anti-ableist speech policing:** (1) **tends to enforce speech norms that presuppose that it doesn't suck to be disabled** and instead the real problem is people's insensitivity regarding the disability (this worry is consistent with praising sensitivity as a key moral virtue\*\*\*\*), **and** (2) **ends up speaking for all disabled people in condescending**ly distorting **ways.**

#### Discourse focus turns people off from the anti-ableist movement, so their ROB fails

**Cogburn 14** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

However, (3) there's another, much broader point. **Anti-ableist speech policing is an example of what is condemned in** Freddie **De Boer's recent** Andrew Sullivan **post** about how online social media is ruining social liberalism: It seems to me now that the public face of **social liberalism has ceased to seem positive**, joyful, human, **and freeing. I** now **mostly associate that** public face with danger, with an endless list of things that you can’t do or say or think, and **with the constant threat of being called** an **existentially bad** person **if you say the wrong thing**, or if someone decides to misrepresent what you said as saying the wrong thing. **There are so many ways to step on a landmine now**, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks. The hundreds of young people I teach, tutor, and engage with in my academic and professional lives teach me about the way these movements are perceived. I have strict rules about how I engage with students in class, and I never intentionally bring my own beliefs into my pedagogy, but I also don’t steer students away from political issues if they turn the conversation that way. **I cannot tell you how common it is for** me to talk to 19, 20, 21 year old **students**, who seem like good people, **who discuss** liberal and **left-wing beliefs as positive ideas, but who shrink from identifying with liberalism and feminism instinctively**. Privately, I lament that fact, but it doesn’t surprise me. Of course much of these feelings stem from conservative misrepresentations and slanders of what social liberalism is and means. But it also comes from the perception that, in the online forums where so much political discussion happens these days, the slightest misstep will result in character assassination and vicious condemnation. If all you've got to offer is cultural revolution type denunciations, you ain't going to make it with anyone anyhow. I hate to say this, but in the glory days of this blog, many of us (well really just most of the men, most of whom quit) contributed to the problem DeBoer describes. We very easily mocked, shut out, and condemned people who weren't conversant in the acceptible ways that social liberals are supposed to speak. I'm ashamed of this now. I mean, lots of students were reading and I think DeBoer gets pretty well the lessons they might have been learning. I hate to think that students today are learning that they better never say anything involving disability because they might be equally denounced. Run Forrest Run! No thanks.

## 2NR

### AT 1AR “Mobility” Discourse K

#### The alt can’t solve; ableism results from markets, not rhetoric, so my conceded turns outweigh

**Vehmas and Watson 14** write[[13]](#footnote-13)

If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. **Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to** the market and **capitalism**, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). **On top of** these **materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as** deviant and **undesirable**, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. **For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition**; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and **ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change.** CDS fails to account for the economic basis of disability and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). **Markets are not controlled by** nor are they subsidiary to **culture; ‘as a result they generate** economic **inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’** (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the **social and physical mechanisms that produce** human **diversity are real, and** they **produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged**, let alone abolished, **merely by** pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and **deconstructing** the **meanings attached to disability**. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can enable the development of communities of resistance, and without it is hard to see how these could develop.

#### The idea that some disabilities would suck to have is ethically necessary—it’s key to debating about disability prevention and improving people’s well-being

**Vehmas and Watson 14** write[[14]](#footnote-14)

The ideas developed within CDS draw heavily on concepts developed in other areas of difference including ethnicity, sexuality and gender. Whilst it is not simply about conflating different approaches together with that of disability studies, the case for similarities are readily made (Shildrick 2012). McCruer (2010), for example, drawing on the ideas of Judith Butler juxtaposes compulsory heterosexuality with compulsory ablebodiedness, arguing that privileging heterosexuality and ablebodiedness acts to the detriment of others. The argument is that by disrupting the categories disabled/ non-disabled, the discrimination experienced by disabled people can be challenged. This attempt at what Sayer (2011) has called normative disorientation found in much of the theorizing around ableism creates problems. For example, **how can we** discuss or **debate prevention when a feature of ableism is** described as **a ‘belief that impairment** (irrespective of “type”) **is inherently negative which should**, if the opportunity presents itself, **be** ameliorated, cured or indeed **eliminated**’(Campbell 2009b, 23)**?** Is the promotion of the use of folic acid before and during pregnancy based on an anti-disablist or perhaps ableist viewpoint; and if so, should CDS be campaigning against those who seek to promote these views? This gap is acknowledged by Meekosha (2011), but it has not been examined or unpacked. Whilst we may be accused here of constructing a ‘straw person argument’ it is consistent with Campbell's claim. This challenge to normativity, of what is good or bad, or right or wrong, characterizes much of the CDS literature. Whilst CDS often makes normative judgements about policies or about the current understanding of disability or how contemporary social organization is morally wrong, it offers no evaluative arguments on impairments or on the implications of living with an impairment. Shildrick (2012, 40), for example, has argued that ‘all bodies are unstable and vulnerable’ and that there is ‘no single acceptable mode of embodiment’. Shildrick attempts a move to an ethical realm by posing what she describes as ‘an important ethical question: how can we engage with morphological difference that is not reducible to the binary of either sameness or difference?’ And, in line with this rather leading question, she continues: ‘If we are to have an ethically responsible encounter with corporeal difference, then, we need a strategy of queering the norms of embodiment, a commitment to deconstruct the apparent stability of distinct and bounded categories’ (Shildrick 2012, 40). In Shildrick’s view, any strategy, political arrangement, or ethical conceptualization that is based on a group identity built upon a binary distinction or difference, is ethically wrong. This is an interesting suggestion but unfortunately Shildrick does not provide any ethical argument to support it or a practical example of how it may be enacted. It is, as Shildrick argues, safe to suggest that there is no ‘single acceptable mode of embodiment’, but at the same time it seems equally safe to suggest that there are a lot of people who would argue that some forms of embodiment are preferential to others. Seeing impairments as acceptable forms of human diversity is not the same as seeing them as neutral or insignificant. **When people say that some forms of embodiment are preferentia**l to others**, they are** ultimately **referring to ideas about** human **well-being**. In other words, one reason why people generally prefer not to have impairments is ethical; they believe that some impairments may in and of themselves prevent people from acting and moving as they wish, from doing valued activities, or faring well in general. Thomas (1999) coined the term ‘impairment effects’ to define these limitations and to separate them from those that arise from disablement. CDS is normative as well, albeit its normative focus is on social factors instead of individuals’ abilities. **CDS, like the social model**, contains a strong normative dimension that **implies what is** right or **wrong as regards social arrangements, but neither** model **takes a clear normative approach to the lived,** embodied and visceral **experiences of having an impairment** (Vehmas 2004). Human beings are dialogical beings and the significance of disability or impairment and their impact on well-being will tend to be comparative. As Sayer argues: ‘we measure ourselves not so much against absolute standards but against what others are like, particularly those with whom we associate the most’ (2011, 122). Evaluative judgements in relation to the individual experience of both disability and impairment are important. If we are to properly understand social phenomena, such as disability, we have to recognize their normative dimensions and the values attached to them. Value-laden statements, as Sayer (2011) argues, can strengthen the descriptive adequacy of accounts. Sayer demonstrates this by using the example of the Holocaust. This, he says, can be represented in two ways: ‘thousands died in the Nazi concentration camps’ and ‘thousands were systematically exterminated in the Nazi concentration camps’. The latter sentence is not only more value-laden than the first, but more accurate as well (Sayer 2011, 45). We would argue that talking about ableism, disablism or oppression does not make sense without reference to normative judgements about people’s well-being, as without such a discussion only a partial picture will emerge. The same may also apply to judgements about fair social arrangements. Disability & Society 641 Downloaded by [108.49.187.33] at 18:35 22 October 2014 CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the pragmatic and mundane issues of day-today living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the foetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, **considerations** having to do **with** pain and **suffering are** nevertheless **morally significant**. The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but **freeing oneself from ableist assumptions may not** in some cases **be enough**. There may be insurmountable realities attached to some impairments where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003). Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. **It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help** the **parents** in **decid**ing **whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death**. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, **even the well-being/ill-being dualism** becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it **can be constructed as** merely **maintaining the dominance of those** seemingly **faring well** (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, **but** in general we can and **we need to agree about** some **necessary elements required for well-being**. Also, **as moral agents we have an obligation to** make judgements about people’s well-being and **act in ways that** their **well-being is enhanced** (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong.

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